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ARGUMENT 
Point IA. Preservation was created when the issue was raised at trial 
in the evidence and in the Defense's opening statement. Defense Counsel 
included the defendant's living condition at trial as part of the totality of the 
circumstances when determining if the Defendant was in actual physical 
possession of the vehicle. R. 146 Lines 9-16. Counsel continued to reiterate 
this issue throughout her questions and by the manner of presentation at trial. 
Counsel's failure to bring up the issue during her closing statement was a 
direct result of her need to address evidence that was entered that should 
have been suppressed, namely any statement to the effect that the Defendant 
drove to the store. 
Point IB. Further, the legal authority behind this rule is not based 
specifically on intent to use the vehicle as a dwelling.. .there is no such 
holding in either direction that I was able to find. The legal basis of this 
claim is that the totality of the circumstances determine the element of actual 
physical control of the vehicle. Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, at 93 
(Ut. App. 1990). In fact, the two cases relied upon in Appellant's brief, 
State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473 (Ut. App. 1993) and Walker, indicate that 
there could be some use to the intent of the driver. Further, while the 
defendant's intention as to his ultimate destination has not been considered 
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definitive, the logic of the court's ruling would include circumstances that 
affect the circumstances to the point that the defendant's sleeping in a 
vehicle, because it was his home, fit in the totality of the circumstances. 
True, there is evidence that may indicate that the defendant was in 
actual physical control of the vehicle, however, given that the defendant is 
the only one in the line of cases cited who has actively lived out of his 
vehicle and been found intoxicated therein, it seems clear that this court has 
never had to determine whether such additional information could tilt the 
scales towards a finding that the defendant did not have actual physical 
control of the vehicle. 
Further, the nature of evidence admitted as to the defendant driving 
the vehicle, especially as it was tainted in closing arguments with the 
objection of the State while defense counsel pointed out the deficiencies of 
State's evidence provided the jury with a method of finding that the 
defendant had driven the vehicle, without adequate evidence, and allowed 
them to make a finding not consistent with actual physical control, justifying 
a remand of this case to retry the issue without the tainted evidence. 
Point IC. Finally, the State's claim that the Defendant fully intended 
to exercise his option to return to the yard appears to ignore the statements 
made directly by the Defendant and mischaracterizes his testimony. The 
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State relies on the Defendant's direct testimony where he stated, "I want to 
kick back at the house, relax, watch some videos, eat dinner and, you know 
stuff like that." R. 182 Lines 7-9. While this statement alone appears to 
infer an intent to return home, the defendant clarified that when his associate 
Curtis, who had driven him to the store parking lot, indicated that he wanted 
to go out drinking, the defendant testified, "I was like, I don't have nowhere 
to go, nowhere to drive, I knew better, not to drive, so, I stayed in my car. 
My car was my home." R. 182 Lines 10-12. The defendant's testimony 
reaffirmed his intent to use his vehicle as his home and his willingness to 
remain at any location, whether in the yard, at the "pusher's" home, or 
wherever his car was located. 
Defense requests that the court to rule that when an individual's sole 
abode is their vehicle, that such an individual would not be able to be in 
actual physical control of a vehicle for purposes of Utah's law regarding 
Driving Under the Influence. However, the Defense understands that the 
issue was unable to receive fair representation at the trial level due to trial 
counsel's failure to prevent the admission of evidence. Therefore, Defense's 
alternative request is for an opportunity for the issue to be heard at the 
District Court and for this court to remand the issue to the Eighth Judicial 
District to be able to address this issue. 
Appellant's Reply Brief- 3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The defense presented the argument of intent to remain in the vehicle, 
but did so without proper appeal or intention, thereby preventing the 
Defendant from obtaining valid defense levels. Without that assistance, 
Defendant was prejudiced from obtaining a thorough and full hearted 
defense as would be necessary for the defendant to obtain a fair trial. 
Point 2A. Defendant adequately presented a valid ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, which was replete with Prejudice, which could 
only been avoided had Trial Counsel's assistance been effective. 
The statement is clearly hearsay under Utah Rules of Evidence 801. 
Appellant counsel should not be obligated to anticipate all situations under 
which hearsay would be admissible for a claim of inadmissible hearsay to be 
established. Appellee's claim for a nonhearsay justification for the evidence 
to be entered is not supported. Under State v. Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, 
*P6 this court reasoned that evidence could only be deemed not hearsay if it 
was unfairly prejudicial, "meaning it has an undue tendency to suggest 
decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional 
one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror." quoting 
Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84,17, 158 P.3d 552 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In this case, the arguments presented in the initial brief are 
such that they infer actual driving by a defendant of a vehicle while 
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intoxicated, allowing a jury to infer guilt of that rule, without application to 
the evidence. In spite of a failure to cite significant legal authority, the 
argument presented developed a clear enough basis for appellee to present 
argument against those charges. 
Point 2B. Furthermore, as the case law presented by the State shows, 
a jury instruction may provide grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel 
if the. "jury was confused or misled by the instruction." United States v. 
Valencia, 907 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1990). Further, the objection provided 
under State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, is not applicable in this case. In 
Malaga the jury instruction objected to had no supporting evidence to supply 
a jury's foundation to apply the conviction, Malaga at 115-16, there the 
defendant was being charged as a principal, and the alternate language 
regarding accomplice liability was not applicable to his situation. With our 
case, however, we find that objectionable hearsay was provided to the jury's 
ears without objection, argument was made in closing argument, which was 
objected to, highlighting the error, and a jury instruction was included the 
elements of the crime for which the objectionably admitted evidence would 
have been intended to establish. The real danger of this ineffective 
assistance of counsel is that by being forced to focus on evidence supplied, 
which would have properly been omitted from the record, trial counsel was 
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unable to effectively argue those positions which would have supported 
overturning the conviction, thus allowing for the alternate outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of counsel, coupled with the errors of testimony and 
evidence submitted to the court, along with an unsuccessful attempt to bring 
a significant issue before the trial court, which prevented the jury from 
having being enabled to make a fair declaration. 
Therefore, this case should be dismissed. The reasons for this are the 
lack of evidence that Appellant actual drove the vehicle and that there is 
substantial evidence that the Defendant's abode was his car within the 
parking lot of the store, which, given the totality of the circumstances should 
show that the Defendant was not in actual physical control of the vehicle. 
In the alternative, because the trial court/jury was hampered in their 
ability to reach a valid determination due to prejudicial information reaching 
the jury, the case should be remanded to the District Court and a new trial 
ordered. 
Dated this 12th day of May, 2011. 
Brett M. Kraus 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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